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Abstract 
Data collection and processing via digital public health technologies are being promoted 
worldwide by governments and private companies as strategic remedies for mitigating the 
COVID-19 pandemic and loosening lockdown measures. However, the ethical and legal 
boundaries of deploying digital tools for disease surveillance and control purposes are unclear, 
and a rapidly evolving debate has emerged globally around the promises and risks of mobilizing 
digital tools for public health. To help scientists and policymakers navigate technological and 
ethical uncertainty, we present a typology of the primary digital public health applications currently 
in use. Namely: proximity and contact tracing, symptom monitoring, quarantine control, and flow 
modeling. For each, we discuss context-specific risks, cross-sectional issues, and ethical 
concerns. Finally, in recognition of the need for practical guidance, we propose a navigation a id 
for policymakers made up of ten steps for the ethical use of digital public health tools. 
 
 
Introduction 
Symptomatic for today’s digitally connected society, the collection and use of data is presented 
as a main strategic remedy in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Across geographies and 
institutions, public health experts and researchers from diverse fields such as epidemiology, 
virology, evolutionary biology, and social science have pointed out the broad range of insights 
that can be gained by collecting, analyzing, and sharing data from diverse digital sources. These 
sources include data from phone towers, mobile phone apps, Bluetooth connections, surveillance 
video, social media feeds, smart thermometers, credit card records, wearables, and several other 
devices and applications. In parallel, Apple and Google, two of the world's largest information 
technology companies, have unprecedentedly banded together to create a decentralized contact 
tracing tool to help people determine whether they have been exposed to someone with the 
SARS-CoV-2 virus.1 
 
While the promise of (big) data analysis has been widely acknowledged and governments, and 
researchers around the globe are rushing to unlock its potential, significant technical limitations 
have also surfaced. These limitations include the accuracy, granularity, and quality of data that 
vary greatly across the different data sources, the adequacy of computation safeguards, and 
 interoperability issues and security  risks. Simultaneously, important ethical and legal risks and 
concerns have been identified that accompany digital disease surveillance and prediction .2 Civil 
rights organizations, data protection authorities, and emerging scholarship have highlighted the 
risk of increased digital surveillance following the pandemic.3 They have emphasized the need to 
meet baseline conditions such as lawfulness, necessity, and proportionality in data processing, 
and the need for social justice and fairness to not get lost in the urgency of this crisis.  
 
As numerous public and private sector initiatives aiming to use digital technologies in the fight 
against COVID-19 continue to emerge, the ensuing debate so far seems to be framed generically 
in a binary choice between using digital technologies to save lives versus respecting individual 
privacy and civil liberties. However, a myriad of interdisciplinary research has shown the vital 
importance of context in managing the societal, legal, and ethical risks of data processing for 
pandemics.4–7 In this article, we seek to contribute to the rapidly evolving debate about the 
promises and risks of digital public health technologies in response to COVID-19. More 
specifically, we offer a typology of the main applications that are currently in use, and we discuss 
their respective features, including both applications and context-specific risks, as well as cross-
sectional issues and ethical concerns. Finally, we propose a navigation aid for policymakers 
suggesting steps that should be taken in order to mitigate risks and strike a defensible risk-benefit 
balance.  
 
Two caveats are important. First, both the typology sketched in this article and the corresponding 
analysis are likely to evolve as new digital public health technologies designed for COVID-19 are 
emerging on an almost daily basis. Second, for this article, we consider digital surveillance and 
contact tracing as part of a broader strategy that is conditioned on large scale testing, universal 
access to health care, and adequate societal safety nets. Absent these conditions, the use of 
digital tools is misguided and irresponsible, given the associated risks.   
 
Typology of digital public health tools  
We identify four main categories of digital public health technologies developed for pandemic 
management: proximity and contact tracing, symptom monitoring, quarantine control, and flow 
modeling.  
1. Proximity tracing tools measure the spatial proximity between users to track their interaction. 
Proximity tracing, sometimes also in conjunction with patient reports or other non-digital 
sources, can identify when users are exposed to a Sars-Cov2 positive individual. Some digital 
tools combine proximity and contact tracing features. For example, the Singaporean app 
TraceTogether uses Bluetooth connections to log other phones nearby and alerts those who 
have been close to a Sars-Cov2 positive user. When users have shared proximal space with 
a Sars-Cov2 positive individual, they are encouraged to self-isolate.8 
2. Symptom checkers are tools of syndromic surveillance that collect, analyze, interpret, and 
disseminate health-related data.9 Using these tools, users report their symptoms, obtain a 
diagnosis, and get a triage decision. Symptom checkers thus provide a cost-effective way of 
helping to triage large international and disperse populations of healthcare-seeking patients. 
Further, the value of digital symptom checkers resides in their enablement of global public 
health surveillance. Such is exemplified by Spain’s CoronaMadrid symptom checking app. 
Using this technology, the government can collaborate with citizens, health professionals, and 
 the private sector to monitor the disease, respond quickly, allocate resources, and generally 
minimize/ control outbreaks.  
3. Quarantine compliance tools involve real-time monitoring of whether symptomatic patients or 
non-symptomatic individuals are complying with quarantine restrictions. Public health 
legislation includes requirements for infected or potentially infected individuals to remain 
isolated from others, so they do not spread the disease further. These technologies can 
provide a mechanism of controlling that infected individuals remain isolated from other 
individuals. Examples include Taiwan’s Electronic Fence that tracks quarantined overseas 
arrivals using mobile phone data.10 
4. Flow modeling tools, otherwise known as mobility reports, quantify, and track people's 
movements in specified geographic regions. Typically, these tools rely on aggregated, 
anonymized sets of data from the geographic location of users. Flow modeling can provide 
insights into the effectiveness of response policies (e.g., social distancing or forced quarantine) 
aimed at combating COVID-19.  
 
This typology allows us to structure these technologies in a four-dimensional model. First, we 
include the key actors involved in design and implementation (government agencies, academia, 
private companies, and citizens). Secondly, we assess the different data types being collected, 
using the classification offered by the GDPR (non-identifying, personal data, and sensitive 
personal data). Thirdly, our typology includes the different origins of these data, including IP 
addresses, call site data, GPS data, Bluetooth, and third-party data. Finally, it considers the 
different types of consent required to collect data, including opt-in consent, opt-out consent, and 
mandatory use. This four-dimensional model allows us to compare the ethical implications of 
different types of technological approaches to pandemic management, as demonstrated in the 
diagram below. 
 
  
Figure 1- Typology of Digital Public Health Technologies against COVID-19 
  
 Ethical and Legal Challenges 
 
These four types of digital public health technologies raise both cross-sectional and domain-
specific ethical-legal considerations. These considerations are rooted in the basic principles and 
moral considerations of public health ethics and data ethics.11,12 
 
Scientific validity, accuracy, and data necessity: Despite widespread enthusiasm about using 
digital public health technologies to combat epidemics, this use involves inevitable compromise. 
On the one hand, digital public health technologies can improve the rapidity of pandemic 
response.13 On the other hand, low data quality and integrity flowing from technical issues can 
have an outsized effect on large-scale predictive models.14 Additionally, the effectiveness of digital 
public health technologies tools for contact tracing depends upon uptake, which will vary 
according to location, the existence of other measures, and disease prevalence. Uncertainty 
about scientific validity and efficacy can make assessing the proportionality and risk of proposed 
measures more challenging.15 Subsequently, measures based on such models may be 
disproportionate, negatively affecting individuals and populations without generating significant 
benefits. While several global actors are independently pursuing digital public health strategies, 
typically at the country-level, it is critical to ensure the interoperability of such digital systems and 
enable efficient, harmonized and secure cross-national data sharing.16 This pandemic is a global 
challenge, hence cannot be tackled only locally and requires new cooperative approaches.  
  
Privacy: All digital public health tools impinge upon individual privacy by requiring some degree 
of access to information about the health status, behavior, or location of individuals.17 However, 
privacy risks vary depending on the purpose and data types used by a digital tool. Digital tools for 
measuring relative spatial proximity among phone users are, ceteris paribus, less privacy-invasive 
than personal contact tracing or quarantine enforcement apps. Likewise, tools using aggregate 
mobile phone tower data are, on average, less privacy-invasive than tools based on GPS data 
and sensor tracking for individual users.18 The use of more granular and specific types of data 
can increase the risk of downstream reidentification of individuals or groups. Further, with the vast 
amount of data being gathered, public health agencies and app developers must prevent 
downstream reidentification through data linkage.19 It is also vital to understand that privacy risks 
can change and accumulate over time, which highlights the importance of strong legislative 
protection. . In the European Union (EU), several regulatory instruments offer varying levels of 
safeguards for the right to privacy, and data protection. These include the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR), the e-Privacy Directive and the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR). 
Likewise, at the Council of Europe level, the European Charter of Human Rights (ECHR) 
guarantees the right to “private life.” However, these regulations set forth the circumstances where 
these rights can be abridged, including during a public health crisis. Further, any digital public 
health technologies abridging these rights must be proportionate to the aims sought. In other 
words, this abridgment must lead to faster restoration of other rights and freedoms suspended 
due to lockdown policies (e.g., freedom of movement and freedom of assembly).20  
  
Consent & voluntariness: Digital public health technologies have the potential to undermine not 
only privacy but also personal autonomy. Specifically, smartphone apps often include permissions 
 to collect data beyond the stated purpose of the app. These data handling practices might strip 
people of their ability to consent to being tracked or having their information shared,21 depending 
on their purpose, mode of data collection, and data source. For example, in order to work properly, 
proximity tracking apps based on Bluetooth need to require or encourage users to keep their 
Bluetooth turned on at all times, creating additional risks. These approaches to data collection 
must respect autonomy, such as by ensuring strategies are in place to update the user regularly.22 
Finally, mandating quarantine apps or technologies for infectious individuals or their contacts 
raises the most severe questions of justifiable coercion. On the one hand, the effectiveness of 
quarantine might be undermined if it remains voluntary rather than mandatory. On the other hand, 
some government activity (such as the Polish government creating shadow profiles for returning 
citizens as part of a quarantine app) may constitute an overreach on autonomy.23 
 
Discrimination: Along with the risk of reidentification and infringement of personal autonomy, 
digital public health technologies also carry an inherent risk of discrimination. Specifically, these 
technologies can be used to collect large amounts of data about entire populations. This data can 
include race, ethnic group, gender, political affiliation, and socio-economic status, which in turn 
can be used to stratify populations by demographics. Many of these demographics are sensitive 
and not necessarily related to a person’s health, and may lead to stigmatization.24 Further, 
information such as racial demographics might lead to a surge in discrimination, as seen by a rise 
in attacks on people of South East Asian descent in the COVID-19 crisis. Therefore, safeguards 
must exist for any digital public health technologies to prevent ‘the predictable from becoming 
exploitable’.19 
  
Repurposing: There is a risk that digital tools could also be applied to other forms of surveillance 
as well as used for legitimate public health purposes (namely tracking and monitoring COVID-19 
patients), but also applied to other forms of surveillance. For example, one NYT report 
investigated Health Code, an Alibaba-backed government-run app that supports decisions about 
who should be quarantined for COVID-19 in China. The report discovered that the app also 
appears to share information with the police.25 Further, the UK and the US have developed 
biosurveillance programs that share the characteristics of both pandemic response and counter-
terrorist programs.26 Therefore, it is crucial to distinguish digital public health technologies that 
allow this third-party sharing of information for non-health-related purposes from those which do 
not. 
  
Expiration: Pandemics are a rare situation where democratic governments can take unchecked 
executive action decisions for the collective good of their population. These include actions that 
might be in contravention of political due process or individual human rights. If prolonged, these 
actions can deprive citizens of their rights, with no guarantee these rights will be restored after 
the end of the crisis. The USA Patriot Act, promulgated after the September 11 terrorist attacks 
in the US, is a good example of how democratic liberties might be ceded after an emergency. 
Likewise, there was an outcry after the regime of Viktor Orban in Hungary instituted powers by 
decree to fight the COVID-19 pandemic without an expiration date. Therefore, heightened 
surveillance empowered by digital public health technologies should not continue after the 
 COVID-19 pandemic has ended. Further, such programs should clarify upfront the duration clearly 
what data they are collecting and the time limit on how long they will hold the information.27  
  
Digital inequality: Digital technology, particularly mobile technology, is increasingly widespread 
globally but unevenly distributed. In 2019, two-thirds of the world’s population did not own a 
smartphone technology, and one third did not own any mobile phone. Smartphone ownership 
disparities are particularly noticeable in emerging economies. For instance, in India, the world’s 
second-most populous country accounting for over 17% of the global population, only 24% of 
adults report owning a smartphone. Even in advanced economies with high smartphone 
ownership rates, not all age cohorts are catching up with digital tools. In 2018, most citizens of 
Japan, Italy, and Canada over the age of 50 did not own a smartphone.28 Any digital public health 
technology solution which relies on mobile phones excludes those without access to these 
technologies for geographic, economic, or demographic reasons. Digital public health 
technologies may be less helpful for both people in low- and middle-income countries and older 
people. If not complemented with non-digital strategies, this latter risk might exacerbate health 
inequalities.  
 
Public Benefit: Underpinning all of the ethical and legal challenges mentioned so far regarding 
pandemic management is the question of public benefit. For the use of digital public health tools 
to be proportionate to any rights impinged, there must be a clear public benefit from their use. 
These benefits can include potential forecasting outbreaks,29 preventing or reducing new 
infections, improving the efficiency of social care and vaccine development, and improving how 
information is communicated to citizens.24 However, to offset the risks and infringement of 
individual rights, there must be a framework for deciding what public benefit is appropriate. In this 
regard, Laurie suggests the test of ‘reasonable benefit’ in the context of data sharing for pandemic 
response.30 Nevertheless, what is reasonable for a digital public health technology will very much 
depend on other risks associated with that technology. 
  
 Mapping ethical and legal challenges 
 
 
Figure 2-  Sunburst diagram mapping the ethical & legal issues raised by applying ethical principles to COVID-19 
Digital Public Health Technologies 
 
 
Ethical use of digital public health tools: A Navigation Aid 
 
Decision-makers who seek to embrace any of the emerging COVID-19 digital public health 
technologies need to address their ethical and legal issues. Further, these decision-makers must 
put safeguards into place to avoid harm and manage the remaining risks. Best practices still have 
to emerge for COVID-19 digital public health technologies. However, given the unique 
circumstances of the current pandemic, procedural guidance - a navigation aid in the form of an 
iterative set of steps to work through - can be useful.  In addition, frameworks for ethical data uses 
that have articulated ethical values and several procedural principles such as adaptivity, flexibility, 
reflexivity, transparency, accountability, responsiveness.31,32 Using these frameworks, we 
propose the following aid. This navigation aid aims to assist decision-makers in ensuring that 
digital public health tools are used throughout their lifecycle in a legally and ethically responsible 
way.10 
 
● Establish guiding ethical principles: In addition to ensuring compliance with fundamental 
rights and applicable legal norms, establish clarity with respect to value commitments, red 
 lines, and guiding principles that will help to navigate tensions or conflicts between values 
when embracing digital technology against the fight of COVID-19.33–36 
● Distinguish tools from purpose: Define specific objectives within the 
containment/mitigation strategy. Only then consider the different data sources and means 
to collect, use, and otherwise process them. Operate within the realm of established laws, 
regulations, and best practices without recourse to emergency regulation or measures.   
● Avoid lock-in and path dependency: Consider the range of tools, techniques, etc. and data 
governance models available once the questions and goals have been determined. 
Understand what the different instruments and models can and can’t do, what their 
promise and limitations are, and use the above list of the technical, legal, and ethical core 
issues as evaluation criteria.    
● Conduct risk assessments: For each intended purpose, context, instrument, and model, 
engage in a robust and systematic risk assessment process even when pressed for time; 
well-established practices such as human rights impact assessment and privacy risk 
impact assessment should lead the way, even if need to be modified.37 Do not limit the 
assessment to a question of compliance; apply a holistic ethics perspective taking into 
account the substantive issues listed in Part 2 of this article. 
● Plan preemptively: Consider the full lifecycle of data and systems and include both online 
and offline effects,38 when conducting risk assessments and determining appropriate 
safeguards. Special consideration is due to context shifts over time and unintended 
consequences, second and third-order effects, and the like. For example, while a proximity 
tracing tool might be privacy-preserving, identification might occur downstream when the 
person has to be isolated or quarantined.  
● Embrace privacy “by design” and “by default” approaches:39 In terms of safeguards, 
consider and combine the most effective legal, organizational, and technical measures, 
including advanced statistical and computational safeguards to manage privacy and data 
protection risks and address ethical issues. Adopt “privacy by design and by default” 
principles from the outset, and build out additional protective layers over time. 
● Assemble the right team: The technical, organizational, legal, ethical, public health and 
other challenges that need to be managed when using digital tools in response to COVID-
19 are complex and require an interdisciplinary team. Ensure to assemble a team from 
diverse backgrounds, with diverse experiences, and high integrity and participate in 
communities of practice.40  
● Communicate proactively and continuously: Transparency in the form of provocative 
communication with the key stakeholders - and where possible active consultation and 
participation with the public - is essential and needs to be an integral part of the process 
from beginning to end. Form communities of practice and also learn from the experiences 
of partners and collaborators.  
● Create systemic accountability: Establish mechanisms to monitor how things work in 
practice, not only as a matter of compliance but also in terms of unanticipated ethical 
ramifications. Leverage existing institutional arrangements and processes and aim for 
independent, external oversight that brings together expertise from different fields to 
oversee the use of ethical health tools, develop stopping rules, conduct period reviews, 
etc. Following the systemic oversight framework, this accountability architecture should 
 be sufficiently adaptive, flexible, inclusive, and reflexive to account for the ever-evolving 
digital public health ecosystem.32 
● Keep records and capture learnings: Throughout these steps, documentation is essential, 
both of the risk assessment itself as well as the safeguards and accountability 
mechanisms that have been taken to mitigate remaining risks, and serves as a basis for 
continued learning, also from mistakes.  
 
 
Figure 3: Alluvial Diagram representing the relationship between ethical principles, ethical & legal 
Issues, & recommendations 
 
In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been a surge in interest for the use of digital 
public health technologies for pandemic management. However, these tools must be guaranteed 
as ethically compliant to ensure widespread public trust and uptake. In this article, we construct 
a typology of the main types of digital public health technologies used to fight the COVID-19 
pandemic, as well as their ethical impacts. We conclude by providing a navigation aid for 
identifying and resolving these ethical impacts where possible. 
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